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From Bloodless Revolution to Bloody
Counterrevolution:
The Adana Massacres of 19091
Bedross Der Matossian
University of Nebraska/Lincoln
The historiography of the Adana Massacres of 1909 is represented by two diverging views. While some Turkish scholars deny the involvement of the local government officials in the massacres by putting all of the blame on the Armenians who
revolted as part of a conspiracy to establish a kingdom in Cilicia, some Armenian
scholars, whose work is overshadowed by the Armenian genocide, accuse the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) of acting behind the scenes to destroy the
Armenian economic infrastructure in Adana in order to curb any future political
and economic development in the area. By deviating from the existing historiography, the present article contends that the Adana Massacres should be viewed
as part of the revolutionary process which led to the erosion of social and political
stability in the region, the creation of weak public-sphere institutions, and intensification of the existing economic anxieties, all of which led to the enactment of
violence against the vulnerable Armenian population of Adana. Understanding
the factors and the motives that led to the enactment of violence will shed new
light on understanding the future acts of violence perpetrated against the indigenous Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire.
Key words: Ottoman Empire, violence, revolution, massacres, Armenians,
public sphere

On 29 August 1908, one month after the Young Turk Revolution, Mihrdat Noradoungian, an Armenian intellectual from Istanbul, wrote a lengthy opinion piece entitled
‘‘The Price of Freedom’’ in the Armenian daily newspaper Puzantion. In this lengthy
article, Noradoungian argued that people were looking with hesitation at this freedom
that came about without any bloodshed. What Noradoungian was implying in the
article is that the Freedom after the revolution should have been received through
violence—probably reminiscent of the violence during the French Revolution which
was able to get rid of the ancien régime:
The change that took place a month ago had the biggest peculiar advantage, to which
the entire world views with bewilderment, and that is the lack of blood and uproar.
Both of these factors are regular phenomenon in these kinds of situations. . . Though
during the [last] 15 years a lot of blood has spilled, there was the fear of greater
bloodshed which did not happen. One should know that this [bloodshed] has become
a natural law and that natural laws are unavoidable. Whatever did not happen in the
beginning could still happen. Whatever the revolution did not do, the counterrevolution will be able to do. There is only one way in order to prevent the occurrence of
this contingency (bloodshed) and that is discretion, modesty, wisdom, and patience.
New freedom is always fragile. Let us be careful.2
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This connection between Revolution, Blood, and the ancien régime was endemic and
not only to the Armenian press in the Ottoman Empire. During the first days of
the constitution, while the revolutionary festivities were at their height, the ethnic
presses (Armenian, Arabic, Greek, Ottoman Turkish, and Ladino, among others)
warned people to be vigilant about the existing fragile situation and be wary of
former officials of the ancien régime.3 However, in comparison to other newspapers,
the Armenian press dealt intensively with the concept of the ancien régime in its
present form, not in its past one.4 One such editorial sought to enlighten the public
about the danger of the situation and the calamities that they should expect.5 The
article is crucial in that it predicts the upcoming calamity of the counterrevolution.
It advised Armenians to not create any pretext for the eruption of these agitations.
On the contrary, the editorial argued that it is the duty of the Armenians to act with
love toward their Turkish brothers and be careful with every act and every word that
could make them bitter against Armenians and incite the people of the ancien
régime. ‘‘We repeat that we need to be careful from shouting ‘Armenian,’ or to talk
about an independent Armenia,’’ argued the editorial. ‘‘The majority of the nation is in
agreement that reforming the condition of the Armenians of Turkey is dependent on the
reform of Turkey.’’ The editorial ends by recommending that Armenians cooperate
with their Turkish compatriots ‘‘who support us and curse the ancien régime.’’ 6
With this connection between revolution and blood in mind, the present article
discusses the correlation between the 1908 revolution and the Adana Massacres of
1909. After briefly reviewing the existing historiography of the Adana Massacres, I
will introduce a new approach to the understanding of these massacres in the larger
context of the revolution, specifically the development of a weak public sphere and
the erosion of social and political stability, all of which led to the escalation of
violence in Adana. Afterward, I will discuss the impact of the Young Turk Revolution
on Adana and demonstrate the ways in which the revolution precipitated the ethnic
tensions leading to the massacres.

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908
The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 represents an important historical juncture in
Ottoman history and the history of the modern Middle East, not as a new beginning,
but rather as a major catalyst in accelerating the dissolution of the empire. Thus,
these two contradicting paradigms of a new beginning and dissolution were interconnected and went hand in hand in marking the last phase of Ottoman history,
the Second Constitutional Period (1908–1918) that ended with the defeat of the
empire in World War I. Within this period two interrelated events took place that
shaped the political scene of the era: (1) The counterrevolution of 31 March 1909
which was initiated by the reactionary forces within the empire and (2) the Adana
Massacres (April 14–17, April 25–27) which led to the destruction of the physical
and the material presence of Armenians in Adana.
The counterrevolution was not a spontaneous outburst by dissatisfied elements
in Istanbul; rather, it was organized by oppositional elements mainly represented
by conservative religious circles within the empire.7 On the night of April 12, the
troops of the First Army Corps mutinied and marched toward Ayasofya Square,
near the parliament, accompanied by a large number of people in religious garb
(softas) shouting slogans in favor of the sultan and demanding the restoration of
the Sher’ia.8 This resulted in the resignation of Hilmi Paşa’s cabinet, which was
promptly accepted by the sultan.9 By royal order, on April 14, Tevfik Paşa was
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appointed the Grand Vezir and Ismail Kemal was elected the President of Parliament.10 This was a huge blow to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) whose
members either fled or were hiding. On April 17 the CUP began to act. The Action
Army (Haraket Ordusu) left Salonika and headed to Istanbul to restore public order
and discipline among the rebellious troops. It established its headquarters at Aya
Stefanos and began negotiations with the new cabinet.11 After failed negotiations,
the Action Army entered Istanbul on April 23 and, after several skirmishes, took
control of the city.
The Adana Massacres of 1909, which became a turning point for the Armenians
living in the Ottoman Empire, were one of the earliest manifestations of violence
during the Second Constitutional Period (1908–1918). Furthermore, the massacres
represent a microcosm of the deterioration of ethnic conflict in Anatolia and its
culmination in the destruction of the indigenous Armenian population during World
War I. Understanding the factors and motives that led to the enactment of violence
will shed new light on the future acts of violence perpetrated against the indigenous
Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire. The present article contends that the
Adana Massacres should be viewed as an integral part of the ongoing power struggle
in Anatolia and the Arab provinces after the revolution.12 An important factor that
contributed to the escalation of ethnic tensions was the emergence of a weak public
sphere within the empire after thirty years of the Hamidian despotic regime. Hence,
to better understand the escalation of ethnic tensions in the empire, it is important
to problematize the notion of modern public sphere and understand its implications
and challenges within the Ottoman milieu.13 Doing so will provide us with better
ways of understanding communal violence as a by-product of modernity.

The Public Sphere and the Ottoman Empire
The notion of the public sphere refers to a social space in which private citizens
gather as a public body with the rights of assembly, association, and expression in
order to form public opinion.14 The history of the notion of the public sphere in the
Ottoman Empire has yet to be written and the present study does not undertake
that task.15 Of course, the public sphere, both in its pre-modern and modern forms,
existed in the Ottoman Empire.16 However, it had a different background and was
affected by different factors from the European milieu.17 As a result of modern urban
development, the public sphere began to enter into its modern form. The modern
public sphere(s) in the empire was spurred by the development of peripheral capitalism and through the opening of urban spaces, in the form of public squares, gardens,
and wider roads. In addition, the process was accompanied by the proliferation of
cafés, associations, theaters, and scientific and literary societies, as a result of which
literary public spheres were formed in the empire. However, the main factor that led
to the proliferation of these public spheres in the empire during the nineteenth century
was the press in general and newspapers in particular.18 The official Ottoman press
began to be published in the nineteenth century and was followed by the emergence
of the private press. The transformation of the literary public spheres into political
public spheres in the modern sense took place throughout the century, reaching
its peak with the promulgation of the Ottoman constitution in 1876.19 In fact, the
creation of the private press and the proliferation of the ethnic press in the second
half of the nineteenth century further developed the notion of multiple public
spheres as opposed to the public sphere dominated by the Ottoman ruling elite.
In 1878, however, Sultan Abdülhamid dissolved the Ottoman parliament and
derailed the constitution, putting an end to the political public sphere. Hence, the
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institutions that once served as the basis of the developing public sphere(s) were
derailed and weakened. He also established one of the most sophisticated spying
systems in the history of the Ottoman Empire. As a result, by the beginning of the
1880s, the ethnic groups’ journalist activities shifted West, from Lebanon, Syria, and
Anatolia to European cities and Egypt. Here, an exilic public sphere was established
in which exiles of different ethnic backgrounds expressed their political views,
discussed their projects for the empire, interacted with each other, and attempted
to mobilize their host governments by using various means of expression, from exilic
media to public gatherings and discussion.20
After the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, this exilic public sphere was transformed into a homeland public sphere. The revolution allowed for an immediate
boom in the serial publications of different ethnic groups in the empire.21 In the two
years after the revolution, censorship was nonexistent. In the first year alone about
200 periodicals were published in Istanbul.22 Hence, the media that served the
development of multiple/competing public spheres prior to the Hamidian period
were reinstated during the post-revolutionary period. However, these contentious
and weak public sphere(s) that lacked strong institutional basis would become the
medium through which the existing tensions in the empire were going to surface,
demonstrating the incompetence of the local administration to deal with contentious
situations. The weak public sphere(s) became a medium through which both the
satisfied and the dissatisfied elements aired their content or discontent with the
new regime and deliberated the political future of the empire by using the tools of
modernity. In addition, the weak public sphere(s) also became an important vehicle
for the enactment of violence by the dissatisfied groups. Thus, the relationship
between public sphere and violence is crucial to understanding the massacres carried
out against the indigenous Armenian population. After the revolution, the growth in
Adana’s public sphere not only fomented political activism within formerly outlawed
groups, but it also contributed to an escalation of ethnic tensions. The physical and
verbal manifestations of Armenians in the public sphere in the forms of cultural and
political processions, the bearing and selling of arms in public,23 and theatrical presentations as well as the use of print media sent alarming vibes among the dissatisfied elements, which began to use the same medium to air their anxieties about
and discontent with the new created order. Thus, the public space in Adana would
become not only the place for the re-enactment of identities; it would also become
a vehicle through which the existing political, social, and economic anxieties would
be manifested in two waves of massacres which took place in conjuncture with the
counterrevolution.

Historiography and the Adana Massacres of 1909
The study of ethnic strife, violence, and repression in the Ottoman Empire in general
and in Anatolia in particular remains marginalized in the historiography of the
Ottoman Empire. Only a handful of scholars have attempted to put these subjects
at the core of their inquiries.24 However, most of these works concentrate on the
Armenian Genocide during World War I and do not consider the incidents of violence
prior to the war.25 Other scholars attempt to represent the acts of violence that took
place at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries as
part of a linear process that culminated in the extermination of the Armenians.26 A
major methodological deficiency of these works stems from the failure to appreciate
that violence during the early phase of the Second Constitutional Period was an
integral part of the revolutionary process. While some Turkish scholars deny the
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involvement of local government officials in the massacres by blaming the Armenians
who revolted as part of a conspiracy to establish a kingdom in Cilicia,27 some Armenian
scholars, whose work is overshadowed by the Armenian genocide, accuse the CUP of
acting behind the scenes to destroy the Armenian economic infrastructure in Adana
in order to curb any future political and economic development in the area.28

Development of Adana’s Public Sphere(s)
It is impossible to understand the development of Adana’s public sphere without
understanding the impact of the revolution on the Anatolian provinces and the
ways in which it led to the emergence of contentious public sphere(s). The Young
Turk Revolution caused major changes in the dynamics of power within the provinces, leading to an erosion of social and political stability. By disturbing a thinly
balanced power equilibrium, the revolution produced a great deal of dissatisfaction
within some segments of the population. The sudden mushrooming of Young Turk
cells and clubs in the provinces caused extreme anxiety among the notables and the
ulema (religious clerics) in the Anatolian provinces. Although the CUP had branches
in all Anatolian and Arab provinces, it was not in full control of the provinces. A
major factor in the deterioration of the intra-ethnic relationship among the Muslims
in Anatolia was the dismissal of local officials and their replacement with CUP
members or people loyal to the CUP. This contributed immensely to the rising
tension between the CUP and the people of the ancien régime, mainly because a
whole stratum of notables who had benefited from the ancien régime had lost power.
Hence, one cannot understand the changes in Adana after the 1908 revolution without understanding the regional waves of discontent manifested after the revolution,
especially in the Anatolian provinces. What distinguished Adana from other provinces was its economic and agricultural centrality to Anatolia—which attracted
thousands of migrant workers arriving from Hadjin, Erzerum, Bayburt, and Bitlis—
and its complex ethnic composition, which was a main catalyst in the deterioration of
this ethnic relationship.29 Therefore, I argue that the conditions created after the
revolution and the emergence of contentious public sphere(s) prepared the ground
for a violent backlash.
Adana was also an important spiritual and economic center for Armenians in
Anatolia. It housed the Sea of the Catholicosate of Sis (Kozan).30 In addition, the
city had eight churches, two of which were Gregorian, one Protestant, and one
Catholic. There were also Greek, Syrian, and Chaldean churches.31 Armenians had
two schools, the Apkarian and the Ashkhenian schools, the French had the Jesuit
missionary school for boys and girls, and the Americans had the Girls College. In
Tarsus, Americans also had St. Paul’s Institute College.32
Prior to the massacres of 1909, Adana’s population consisted of 62,250 Muslims;
30,000 Armenians; 5,000 Greeks; 8,000 Chaldeans; 1,250 Assyrians; 500 Christian
Arabs; and 200 foreign subjects.33 The Muslim population of Adana included Turks,
Kurds, Fellahs, Circassians, Avshars, Cretans, and nomads. In addition, every spring
about 30,000–40,000 migratory workers would come to Adana from Aleppo, Harput,
Sivas, Diarbekir, Erzerum, Hajin, Bitlis, Bayburt, and Erzerum to work as farmers,
tilling, reaping, and cultivating the cotton fields, or to work in factories.34 The Muslim
migrant workers always exceeded the Armenian migrant workers by a ratio of 2:1.
Adana was also the center of the cotton trade on the Cilician Plain.35 David
Fraser who visited Adana prior to the 1908 revolution argued that at the end of the
nineteenth century it was customary for 60,000 laborers to visit Cilicia annually
for the purpose of assisting with the harvest. However, he argues that this annual
156

From Bloodless Revolution to Bloody Counterrevolution

migration had ceased at the beginning of the twentieth century because the resident
population aided by steam ploughs, steam threshers, and reaping machines was not
able to undertake the labor by itself. This point is extremely important because it
demonstrates the ways in which the introduction of modern agricultural and production technologies have caused substantial dissatisfaction among the migrant workers
who used to benefit from the pre-modern agricultural mediums and has created what
Ayhan Aktar calls ‘‘accumulated envy’’ toward the Armenians.36 This ‘‘accumulated
envy’’ would reveal itself in violent backlash by the migrant workers against the
Armenians. In addition to this, Adana also housed several large establishments
involved with ginning, spinning, and weaving. Among these, the most important
factory was owned by the Greek Trypani Brothers who introduced the cotton industry to Cilicia.37 In addition, the Deutsche Levant Cotton Company, which was
financed by German, Swiss, and Austrian financiers, was also active in the region.38
The Armenian population was very involved in trade and industry. They played a
predominant role in exporting materials from Adana.39 Armenian sources indicate
that Armenian prosperity in Adana was lamented by some Turkish notables, such
as Abdülkadir Bağdadizade, one of the most influential notables in Adana.40

The Ottoman Public Sphere in Adana: The Climax of Contentious
Politics between the CUP and the Notables
As soon as the constitution was enacted, people in Adana and Mersin began rejoicing. Masses were held in honor of the sultan and the Ottoman nation.41 However,
these festivities of the revolution were only euphoric feelings that did not reflect the
different social sectors’ actual attitudes toward the revolution. The revolution and
the reinstatement of the constitution in Adana led to the rise of new figures. Ihsan
Fikri, a self-acclaimed Young Turk, suddenly became a public figure. Fikri played
an important role in organizing festivities in honor of the revolution. At the end of
the festivities, Fikri sent a congratulatory telegram to the CUP branches in Manastir,
Salonica, and Istanbul on behalf of the people of Adana. The next day the CUP
Central Committee asked Fikri to establish a CUP branch in Adana.42 To counter
the CUP’s influence, Abdülkadir Bağdadizade,43 one of the most influential notables
of Adana, formed a group called the Agricultural Club (Zirâat Kulübü) composed of
Adana notables, people from Idlib, and softas.44 They were supported by another
anti-CUP committee, the Scientific Committee (Cemiyet-i İlmiye). As with the other
CUP branches in the provinces, people from the ancien régime entered the ranks
and the first task of the new CUP branch was to force the local vali (governor) to
resign.45 Bahri Paşa resigned and for some time the CUP branch administered
the province. It also succeeded at removing Kâzim Bey, the chief of police ( polise
müdürü), and police superintendent (komiser) Zor Ali from their positions.46 In addition, the CUP began sending delegates, consisting of one Armenian and one Turk, to
villages to preach to the masses about the constitution. In order to better understand
the tension that arose between the CUP and the local notables, it is important to
give a brief historical background of Ihsan Fikri.
Ihsan Fikri, whose original name was Ahmed Tosun, had been an officer of the
Salonica Agriculture Department. He was later exiled to Diyarbekir and then to
Payas. After his exile to Payas, he represented himself as a liberal. Bahri Paşa, the
vali, interceded with the authorities on his behalf to end his exile.47 After returning
to Adana, he married the daughter of a local property owner by the name of Menan
Bey. Prior to the revolution, Fikri had been the principal of the Handicraft School
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(Sanayi Mektebi) but was fired by the vali, who replaced him with Gergerlizade Ali
Effendi. After the revolution and the establishment of the CUP branch in Adana under
his leadership, Fikri began to persecute his opponents, particularly Gergerlizade.48
As a result, two groups emerged in Adana, one supporting Fikri and another
supporting Gergerlizade.49 This tension can be best defined as CUP versus the
local notables. In this intra-ethnic struggle the press played an important role.
In the post-revolutionary period five newspapers were published in Adana: Seyhan,
Yaşasın Ordu, İtidal, edited by Ihsan Fikri; Rehberi İtidal, owned by Ali Ilmi
Effendi; and Çukurova, a weekly newspaper published by Mahmud Jelaleddin. İtidal
and Rehberi İtidal were in constant conflict. The latter was also supported by
Çukurova. According to Terzian, Ihsan Fikri wrote erratically, praising the Armenians
one day and attacking them the next.
After Bahri Paşa resigned, he was replaced by Mirliva Ali Paşa, who generally
kowtowed to the CUP. When Cevad Bey was appointed vali, tensions began to escalate
dramatically. Ihsan Fikri, seeing Cevad Bey’s weakness, tried to manipulate him into
removing Gergerlizade from his position as the principal of the school. Gergerlizade,
however, gained the vali’s favor. In addition, Cevad Bey used to frequently visit the
Agricultural Club and the Scientific Committee.50 This angered Fikri, who began
openly attacking the vali in İtidal, even calling for his resignation, but to no avail.51
Furthermore, he claimed that government was nonexistent in Adana and that it
was people like Abdülkadir Bağdadizade who were truly running the affairs of the
country. In this tensed atmosphere, Zor Ali, the former police commissary (komiser)
of Adana who had been dismissed by the CUP, arrived in Adana and declared himself a member of the Fedakârini Millet, a branch of the Ittihadi Mouhamadi, and
called on people of the same mind to join him.52 In this atmosphere of intra-ethnic
tension, news of the counterrevolution reached Adana, further altering the power
balance within the provinces.

The Armenian Public Sphere: Testing the Limits of Freedom
The Armenian festivities and demonstrations in honor of the constitution on 24 July
1908 were especially striking. The public sphere created after the 1908 revolution
allowed Armenian political parties to be active in Adana. Armenian cultural revival
began. Poetry, odes, and dramas about the Armenian national past began to be
published and performed, causing anxiety among the local Muslim population. In
addition, Armenians, ‘‘intoxicated with the new wine of liberty, often gave offense
by wild talk or arrogant behavior.’’ 53 In an interview with an Armenian newspaper
after the massacres, missionary Christie positioned at Tarsus argued that there is no
proof that the Christians as a whole desired separation from the Ottoman people or
government. Granted, he argued that there were a very few foolish men (Armenians)
who by their boasting and threats exasperated the Turks. However, he adds that
‘‘their acts and words ought not to be taken as justifying in the slightest degree the
cruelties that make this recent massacre worse than any that have gone before it.’’ 54
Armenian activities in the post-revolutionary period entailed physical and verbal
manifestations in the public sphere causing much anxiety among the dissatisfied
elements. For example, İtidal, the main Young Turk organ in Adana edited by Ihsan
Fikri, reported that on Sunday 29 March 1909 a play was performed by Armenians
at the Casino of Ziya Paşa in Mersin.55 In the words of one contemporary Ottoman
official in Adana, ‘‘At that night Armenians had opened the first curtains of revolt’’
(İşte Ermeniler ilk isyan perdesini o gece açmışlardır).56 The play was entitled
Temurlane and the Destruction of Sivas.57 The local mutessarif (subgovernor), as
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well as other officials, was invited to attend the play. At the beginning of the play,
Temurlane gives an order to exterminate all the Armenians. A fierce struggle takes
place between Temurlane and an Armenian king. The king, along with his servant
and his daughter, becomes Temurlane’s prisoner. The king, hands chained and wearing a thorn crown, sits hopelessly in a cell allocated to him by Temurlane. Suddenly,
two spirits appear before the king telling him that he will reclaim his kingdom
through the unity of his nation. And when the king tells the spirits that all of
the Armenians have been massacred, the spirits answer as follows: ‘‘These are
enough, do not feel sorry, thanks to unity the day will come that you will restore
your monarchy [kralığın tasdik edecekler]. You are going to preserve your independence, be restful, do not detach yourself from unity, once more in the future you
will regain your crown.’’ İtidal reported that when the curtain closed all of the
Armenians in the audience began shouting and applauding ‘‘Long live Armenia,’’
‘‘Long live Armenian kingdom,’’ ‘‘Long live Armenians.’’ 58
On another occasion, a performance of Hamlet by the Armenian students of St.
Paul’s College of Tarsus made government officials and the local mufti (Islamic
scholar) uneasy. Helen Davenport (Brown) Gibbons, who taught at the school,
described the play and her role in putting on the performance in detail in a letter
sent to her mother on 7 April 1909. Gibbons described that when things began to
go badly for Hamlet’s stepfather, people stopped fanning. The attending dignitaries
became uneasy, and hunched their shoulders. They kept their eyes glued to the
stage. She continued:
They are not familiar with our great William, and believe, no doubt, that we invented
the play as well as the actors’ costumes. Horror of horrors! We had forgotten what
they might read into the most realistic scene. An Armenian warning for Abdul
Hamid? The assassins mastered the struggling king. He lay there with his red hair
sticking out from his crown, and the muscles of his neck stiffened as he gasped for
breath while his throat was cut with a shiny white letter-opener.59

In addition to these, the relationship in Adana between Armenian ecclesiastic leadership and the local government deteriorated after the 1908 revolution, particularly
after the removal of the vali Bahri Paşa who had a cordial relationship with the
Armenians and especially with Bishop Moushegh Seropian.60 Fearful of what might
happen, the Catholicos of Sis, Sahag, sent telegrams to Istanbul warning of imminent massacres in the area. The Ottoman-Turkish newspapers of Istanbul reacted
negatively to these telegrams, saying ‘‘we do not want to believe in the existence of
the threat of massacre.’’ 61 At the time, the prelate of Adana, Bishop Moushegh, was
on a mission to Istanbul. When he returned to Adana he found that letters from the
villages warning of imminent threats have accumulated. Bishop Moushegh also sent
a pastoral letter to the Armenians of Adana emphasizing the need for harmony
among the people.62 However, the uncertain situation and the rising tension led
Bishop Moushegh to encourage Armenians to buy arms63:
We advise the people, in order to be able to fulfill their duties towards the country
and constitution, every person should be armed more or less according to his ability.
That readiness should be at the same time somehow a means for self-defense, against
an unfortunate attack, until the constitutional government comes to their aid.64

Dr. Christie, the American missionary, criticized Bishop Moushegh’s words and
deeds and those of the young men who were following him. He argued that it was
wrong to bring tin boxes of arms and ammunition to Mersin addressed to Armenians
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in Adana.65 However, he explained that even these do not prove that there was an
intention to rebel against the government.66 Thus, Bishop Moushegh in the eyes
of the local Muslim population became an agitator and the source of tensions for
inciting the Armenians against the Turks and encouraging them to establish Kingdom Cilicia.67 As a result, twenty-five days before the massacres Bishop Moushegh
was banished from Adana to Cairo by orders from the vali.68

The Consolidation of Violence: The Breaking Point
In March 1909 ethnic tension began to deteriorate dramatically, as manifested in a
couple of sporadic attacks on Armenians.69 One of these attacks became the catalyst
precipitating the first wave of the Adana Massacres/Clashes. On 28 March 1909, an
Armenian named Hovhannes was attacked by a group of Turks, led by a man named
Isfendiar.70 During the ensuing fight, Hovhannes killed Isfendiar, wounded some of
the other attackers, and fled to the Armenian Quarter in Adana. From there he
escaped to Cyprus. Isfendiar’s funeral attracted not only those angered by the
killing, but also much of the element dissatisfied with the new order, the constitution, and its Armenian ‘‘collaborators.’’ The body was dragged through the streets
for exhibition and became a catalyst in the manifestation of the existing economic
and political anxieties. This immediately led to the mobilization of the masses and
prepared the ground for the enactment of violence.71 Inflammatory remarks were
made in the mosques and it was proclaimed that the Armenians of Adana had risen
and were ‘‘killing true believers and burning their houses.’’ 72 Isfendiar’s family demanded that the vali capture the murderer.73 A few days later, one of Hovhannes’s
other attackers died from the wounds he received, elevating the level of anger and
excitement among the Muslim population. As the situation intensified, the vali of
Adana telegrammed Istanbul warning of an imminent threat in Adana. Adil Bey,
on behalf of the Ministry of Internal Affairs responded, ‘‘The financial institutions
along with foreign buildings should be protected and peace should be preserved’’
(Müessesât-ı mâliye ile emâkin-i ecnebı̂yenin muhâfazası ve iâde-i âsâyişe dikkat
olunması).74 Some Armenian sources understand this telegram as an order to
massacre the Armenians.75 This sentence, however, is too vague to necessarily be
understood in that way. With the arrival of news about the counterrevolution from
Istanbul, the situation exploded.

The First Waves of Massacres/Clashes (April 14, 15, and 16)
‘‘What could I do, if there is Constitution.
Whatever the majority wants they will do so’’76
In Adana, Tuesdays were market days. Peasants would travel from their villages
to Adana in the morning and return in the evening. On Tuesday, 13 April 1909,
these peasants did not return to their homes. It is also noteworthy that because of
seasonal migration, 30,000–40,000 additional Armenian, Kurdish, and Turkish farm
workers inhabited Adana.77 On April 14, the disturbances began. Armenians opened
their shops in the early morning, but soon saw groups of Turks, Kurds, Circassians,
Başıbozuks,78 Cretans, and Muslim refugees along with the seasonal workers carrying hatchets, blunt instruments, axes, and swords in their hands and wearing white
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bandages (saruks) around their fezzes79 in various quarters of the city.80 This made
the Armenians extremely anxious, and they quickly closed their shops.81 When the
Muslims saw that Armenians were closing their shops early they too became anxious,
and a rumor spread that the Armenians were going to attack them. The mob, consisting of Turks, Kurds, Fellahs, Circassians, Gypsies, and Cretan refugees along
with the migrant workers, began looting and attacking the center of the town.82 Zor
Ali, the police superintendent, rallied his troops and besieged the Armenian Quarter
of Şabaniye. Meanwhile, Armenians took a defensive position in the Armenian Quarter
and fortified themselves in houses.83
The first day of the massacres/clashes saw sporadic and unorganized attacks. On
the first night, the mob began burning the Armenian Quarter.84 The attacks and the
clashes intensified the next day.85 The majority of the Armenian population found
shelter in Armenian churches and schools and some in foreign missions. By the third
day, the mob grew as Turks arrived from Aleppo and Sivas to take part in the
pillage. Since the Armenians were running short on ammunition, they asked the
government for protection.86 In response, the vali organized a reconciliation meeting
between Turkish and Armenian notables.87 By the fourth day the situation had
calmed. It is impossible to accurately assess the number of casualties. Hundreds of
wounded Armenians were taken to the Apkarian Armenian school which was turned
into a hospital. Many Armenians escaped to Mersin.88 The carnage, looting, and
killing lasted for three days (April 14, 15, and 16). Many Armenians were killed as
well as many Muslims, some of whom were killed while attacking the Armenian
Quarter. It seems that the first wave of massacres/clashes was minor compared
to the second wave that will be discussed next. Nevertheless, Armenian shops,
businesses, and institutions suffered immense damage.89

Public Sphere and the Transition from Verbal to Physical Violence
Most Armenian and European sources indicate that Ihsan Fikri, the leader of
the CUP in Adana, and his newspaper İtidal played an important role in inciting
the masses before the initiation of the second wave of massacres.90 However, these
sources do not tell us exactly what kind of discourse was being propagated by İtidal.
This raises important questions about the transition from violent political discourse
to physical violence. In cases of extreme escalation of ethnic tensions, during which
the existing political and civil institutions are unable to contain the lawlessness and
disorder of a region, the public sphere becomes the medium through which violence
manifests itself. Furthermore, it contributes to the precipitation of ethnic tensions
and accelerates the motives for the perpetration of violence against the vulnerable
group. In the case of Adana, instead of declaring a state of siege, the local government chose to reconcile both parties who were involved in the violence by making
superficial statements about coexistence and harmony. The public sphere was not
restrained nor did the local government take the necessary steps to suppress provocative statements by reactionary groups. On the contrary, the printed form of communication, one of the most important components of a public sphere, was used to
instigate the public against the vulnerable population. Hence, Ihsan Fikri was able
to verbally attack the Armenians, using extraordinarily violent language, and to
convince the masses that the Armenians had attempted a coup d’etat to establish
the Kingdom of Cilicia.91 According to the British vice consul in Adana, DoughtyWylie, every Turk in Adana was fully persuaded at the time that the Armenians
had set fire to their own houses with the idea of bringing about foreign intervention.
Stories about Armenian atrocities on Muslim men and women were also widely
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spread.92 According to Doughty-Wylie, the Turks put all of the blame on the Armenians
because they armed themselves and because certain delegates of the Hunchak Party,
and preachers like Bishop Moushegh, had urged the Armenians to openly fight the
Turks and set up a principality; the Turks also believed that they had fixed a day
on which to rise and rebel against the Turks.93 Although Doughty-Wylie believed
that the Hunchak Party was planning something, he nevertheless argued that they
represented a fraction of the people. On the contrary, he argued that such widespread destruction could not have taken place without some ‘‘secret preparation on
the Turkish side,’’ 94 demonstrating the premeditated nature of the event.95
On 20 April 1909, thousands of free copies of İtidal were distributed in the
streets of Adana. In this issue, Fikri along with his colleagues Ismail Sefa96 and
Burhan Nuri vehemently attacked the Armenians.97 In an article entitled ‘‘An Awful
Uprising’’ (Müdhiş bir Isyân), Sefa stated that a wave of boiling rage and independence was destroying the country.98 He argued that Armenians, like the Turks,
had been oppressed for thirty-three years by the despotic regime. Then they united
with the Turks and applauded their ‘‘holy revolution.’’ However, Sefa argued that
Armenians soon began preparing themselves for the ensuing uprising by stockpiling
weapons. According to Sefa, once the Armenians possessed weapons, their rhetoric
changed. The phenomenon of Armenian fedayees (fighters) with Mauser riffles roaming the streets alarmed the Turks. According to Sefa, the first signs of agitation
occurred on Friday when two Muslim youths were killed in the Şabaniye neighborhood. He was referring to the murder of Isfendiar. Sefa argued that although the
vali had assured the Turkish population that he would capture the murderer, thus
restoring order, the Armenians refused to turn over the murderer. For Sefa this
was nothing less than an uprising (isyân). Sefa concluded that when the Armenians,
‘‘after all this barbarism and crime,’’ saw the profusion of soldiers and people pouring in from the villages and understood that they would not succeed, they stopped
their attacks.
In the same issue, an article by Burhan Nuri posed the rhetorical question ‘‘can
the Armenians establish a state?’’ Burhan answered that only the foolish would
believe that Armenians, numbering less than two million scattered throughout the
empire, could defeat the Ottoman Empire and be able to establish an independent
country.99 Burhan attacked the European powers in his article saying that any
European power cannot impose on the Ottoman Empire the establishment of an
Armenian state in Cilicia. Burhan concluded as follows:
If the Armenians intend to form a state, the land for that state should not be in the
Ottoman Empire, rather they should look for it in the poles, in the desert lands of
Africa and immigrate there. They cannot reach their goal scattered in Istanbul,
Adana, Aleppo, Diyarbekir, Bitlis, and Van.

In the section of İtidal on news from the provinces, an editorial lamented that Adana
would be ‘‘the victim of this horrible barbarism.’’ The editorial argued that while
the Turks were striving to live with the Armenians in happiness, the Armenians
caused a ‘‘huge calamity on the head of the country through the organization of an
agitation.’’ 100
Armenians, according to the editorial, had arrived in Adana from Marash,
Hadjin, Harput, Diyarbekir, and from the Armenian populated provinces of Anatolia.
The article argued that by forming a majority in the area, Armenians hoped to
create agitation and demand autonomy.101 They were encouraged in this by the
success of Austria-Hungary in annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina and by the de jure
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independence of Bulgaria from the Ottoman Empire on 5 October 1908. For this
purpose, they hoped to provoke the intervention of the European powers. The article
concluded by saying that ‘‘looking at the painful situation, there is no doubt that
they [the Armenians] were the reason of their own destruction, the Turks, and of
the country.’’ 102
The editorial board of İtidal provided its own version of the causes and reasons
for the deterioration of the ethnic relations and their culmination in the massacres.
Whether or not the claims made by İtidal were true, they were vital in shaping
public opinion in Adana, particularly the claims regarding an Armenian conspiracy.
These articles in İtidal fumed public opinion in Adana after the first wave of
massacres/clashes.

The Second Wave of the Massacres (April 25—27)
When Armenians heard the news that additional troops were going to come to Adana
from Mersin to help preserve order, they were elated.103 On April 25, 850 soldiers
from the second and the third regiments arrived from Dede Ağaç. After the regiments set up a camp in Adana, shots were fired at their tents. A rumor immediately
spread that the Armenians had opened fire on the troops from a church tower in
town.104 The military commander of Adana, Mustafa Remzi Paşa, made no attempt
to validate these rumors, but nevertheless ordered his soldiers to strike back at the
Armenians. On Sunday, April 25 at 1:00 p.m. a battalion attacked the Armenian
school that housed the injured from the first wave of the massacres. Soldiers poured
kerosene on the school and set it on fire with people inside.105 Regular soldiers,
reserve soldiers, and mobs along with the Başıbozuks attacked the Armenian
Quarter. They burned down churches and schools. The conflagration in the city of
Adana continued until Tuesday morning, April 27, and destroyed the entire Armenian residential quarter and most of the houses in the outlying districts inhabited
by Christians.106
Another factor which precipitated the massacres was the unwillingness of
Turkish troops to maintain order. Armenian sources indicate that weapons were distributed freely by the government to local civilians who took part in the massacres,
looting, and carnage. The second wave of the massacres was larger in scale and more
violent than the first. While the massacres in the city of Adana were taking place,
rumors spread throughout the province that Armenians had revolted in Adana,
killed all the Muslims, and were going to destroy the villages. This caused extreme
anxiety and provoked retaliatory attacks by the Muslims on Armenian villages.

Conclusion
More than 100 years have passed since the massacres of Adana and historians continue to debate what the main causes of the massacres were. Indeed, the revolution
should be regarded as the major catalyst in the deterioration of the situation. However, the massacres would not have taken place without the host of other factors
mentioned in this article. The violence inflicted on the indigenous Armenian population should be understood as a manifestation of the anxieties caused by the major
change within the political framework brought by the revolution. The weak institutions of the public sphere(s) in Adana played a dominant role in intensifying these
anxieties and causing much distress among the local population and the notables of
the ancien régime. This anxiety was not only political; rather it had serious economic
ramifications at a time when modern agricultural technologies had replaced the
old ones, causing much dissatisfaction among the poor migrant workers who were
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benefiting from pre-modern modes of production. Thus, the dominant role played by
the migrant population in the massacres could also be interpreted as an attack on
modernization, represented by drastic changes in the mediums of production.
The bloodshed that Mihrdat Noradoungian was so much worried about did materialize during the counterrevolution. What followed was two waves of clashes, massacres, pillaging, and looting. The complicity of local government officials, such as the
vali Cevad Bey and the commander of the army Mustafa Remzi Paşa, is undeniable
as the Military Tribunals and the investigation commissions sent from Istanbul
attested.107 Worse yet was the role that one of the most important notables of
Adana, Abdülkadir Bağdadizade, and his faction played in the massacres.108 The
CUP representative in Adana, Ihsan Fikri, along with Ismail Sefa, played a dominant role in shaping public opinion and transforming verbal into physical violence.109
The reaction of the central government and the CUP against the real culprits of the
massacre was lenient, as the court martial’s decision attested.110 Most of the key
architects of the massacres mentioned above received light sentences. About fifty
Muslims (some of them innocent)111 and six Armenians were sentenced to death
and many were sentenced to imprisonment with hard labor.112 It seems that the
CUP, having just recovered from a huge blow as a result of the counterrevolution,
was afraid to take drastic action against the real culprits of the massacres because
it was afraid that this would have wider effects in the region and would endanger
its existence. The Adana massacres not only resulted in huge Armenian loss of
life, but also led to the destruction of one of the most important Armenian economic
centers in Anatolia.
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Archives européennes de sociologie / European Journal of Sociology 43, no. 1 (2002):
92–115. Some have argued that the notion of public sphere applies to periods well
before the late eighteenth century, while others challenged the distinction and relationship that Habermas envisions between ‘‘public’’ and ‘‘particular’’ realism. See, for
example, Harold Mah, ‘‘Phantasies of the Public Sphere: Rethinking the Habermas of
Historians,’’ The Journal of Modern History 72, no. 1 (2000): 153–82, 158. Some have
criticized Habermas’s idealization of the liberal public sphere while others point out
that he failed to examine other, non-liberal and non-bourgeois, competing public
spheres. See Nancy Fraser, ‘‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the
Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,’’ in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig
Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 115. The criticism of Habermas’ public
sphere created new approaches to our understanding of the public sphere. See Calhoun,
Habermas and the Public Sphere; Nick Crossley and John Michael Roberts, eds.,

165

Genocide Studies and Prevention 6:2 August 2011

15.

16.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

22.

23.

24.

After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing/
Sociological Review, 2004). First, criticism revealed the exclusionary nature of the
Habermasan public sphere in its classical liberal form. Second, it argued for the multiplicity of public spheres or publics as opposed to the existence of one dominant public
sphere. Third, it introduced the notion of counter-public or subordinate public sphere.
Nancy Fraser proposes calling them subaltern counter-publics ‘‘in order to signal that
they are parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent
and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs’’ (123). This is important, because in the Ottoman case we see
not only the emergence of one dominant public sphere, but also the development of
competing/contending non-dominant public sphere(s). The interaction between these
competing/contending public spheres would become an important catalyst in the deterioration of ethnic relations in Anatolia.
One of the best studies that exist on the public sphere in Muslim societies is Miriam
Hoexter, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, and Nehemia Levtzion, eds., The Public Sphere in
Muslim Societies (Albany: State University of New York Press; Jerusalem: Van Leer
Jerusalem Institution, 2002). See also Eickelman and Salvatore, ‘‘The Public Sphere
and Muslim Identities’’; Srirupa Roy, ‘‘Seeing a State: National Commemorations and
the Public Sphere in India and Turkey,’’ Comparative Studies in Society and History
48, no. 1 (2006): 200–232.
Harold Mah argues that what distinguishes modern from pre-modern forms of the
public is the particular mode of form of the public subject. Harold Mah, ‘‘Phantasies of
the Public Sphere,’’ 165.
Haim Gerber, ‘‘The Public Sphere and Civil Society in the Ottoman Empire,’’ in
Hoexter, Eisenstadt, and Levtzion, Public Sphere in Muslims Societies, 75.
See Ami Ayalon, The Press in the Arab Middle East (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995).
Notably, for different ethnic groups the emergence of the political public sphere took
place in different decades of the nineteenth century.
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Adana and the Memoirs of Konya) (New York: Gochnag Press, 1950), 15.
Ibid.
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Adana Vak’ası Hakkında Rapor, 2–3. The book that Çalyan wrote after the Adana
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Çalyan, Adana Vak’ası Hakkında Rapor, 3. Ferriman Duckett, The Young Turks and the
Truth about the Holocaust at Adana in Asia Minor, during April, 1909 (London, 1913),
12.
‘‘Muka#taba#t: Mersin’’ (Correspondence: Mersin), Lisan al-Hal 5793, 19 August 1908, 3.
For detailed information about the event see ‘‘Azatut‘yan Do#ně Gawarin Me#ch: Mersin
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21_5 (archives).
See Doughty-Wyllie to Sir G. Lowther, Adana, 2 May 1909. See also Çalyan, Adana
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Adana and the Memoirs of Konya) (New York: Gochnag Press, 1950), 55. See also
Lawson P. Chambers to William Peet, 4 May 1909, ABCFM Archives, 10.
Woods, The Danger Zone of Europe, 137.
See note 95 above.
See Ministry of Internal Affairs, telegram to the Vilayet of Adana, 11 July 1909 (28
Haziran 1325), DH.MKT, 2872/68.
See Ministry of Internal Affairs, telegram to the Prime Minister, 12 July 1909 (29
Haziran 1325), DH.MKT, 2873/58.

172

From Bloodless Revolution to Bloody Counterrevolution

110.
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